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BOOK REVIEWS 105 
Collins' piece on the teleological argument is thought-provoking. After 
arguing that the fine-tuning of the constants, laws and forces of nature is 
more probable on theism than on a naturalistic single-universe hypothesis, 
he considers the stiffer competition of a hypothesis that there are an infinite 
number of universes, some of which seem bound to have life-permitting 
conditions like ours. His assessment: "usually these universes are thought 
to be produced by some sort of physical mechanism, which I will call a 
many-universe generator .... [but the] generator itself would need to be well-
designed" (143-5). This response assumes that there is no guarantee that 
the universes in question will play out all the nomological possibilities, even 
if there are an infinity of them; one still needs a designer to generate life. I 
am still puzzling over whether this interesting suggestion is plausible. 
Though some of the essays in it are better than others, taken as a whole, 
this anthology offers a strong cumulative case for theism-one that comes 
from many voices, offering better versions of the usual arguments than 
their classical forms. It could serve as a good text for a philosophy of reli-
gion course, if it were coupled with an extended argument for atheism to 
ensure even-handedness. Prospective users should be aware, however, 
that some parts of the text seem to speak to a Christian audience (e.g., 
Moser develops an account of knowledge based on I Corinthians, see also 
150-151, 199, 231), so it would function better in a Christian setting than, 
say, at a public university. This is unfortunate, since the aim of the book is 
to persuade people that theism is rational, and many who could be per-
suaded are in non-Christian settings. 
Ontology, Identity, and Modality: Essays in Metaphysics, Peter van Inwagen. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Pp. ix + 261. $65 (cloth); 
$23 (paperback). 
JONATHAN L. KV ANVIG, University of Missouri 
The experience of reading this book is precisely that experience that drew 
many of us to philosophy in the first place-it is full of insight and preci-
sion, two properties not always conjoined in philosophical discourse (said 
with a British accent to indicate the humor of understatement). The philo-
sophically smug will find much to criticize-that my left leg is not a mater-
ial object, for instance. And van Inwagen often makes pronouncements 
that will strike one as a bit too arrogant-most often under the rubric of 
"not understanding" what a philosopher might mean when making any of 
various claims which van Inwagen refuses to endorse (such as that identity 
through time might fail of transitivity). His criticisms· and complaints are 
not superficial, however; they are instead the product of decades of trying 
to work through completely and carefully the implications of various posi-
tions and arguments. 
This book is a collection of thirteen of van Inwagen's essays in meta-
physics published over the past twenty-five years or so, organized by the 
concepts in the title. It also contains an informative introduction by van 
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Inwagen explaining how he conceives of the general categories into which 
the essays fall. 
The essays in the ontology section are: "Meta-ontology," "Why I don't 
understand substitutional quantification," "Creatures of fiction," and 
"Why is there anything at all?". The essays in the identity section are: "The 
doctrine of arbitrary undetached parts," "Composition as identity," "Four-
dimensional objects," "Temporal parts and identity across time," and 
"Materialism and the psychological-continuity account of personal identi-
ty." The essays in the modality section are: "Indexicality and actuality," 
"Plantinga on trans-world identity," "Two concepts of possible worlds," 
and "Modal epistemology." The articles span the work of more than two 
decades, with the earliest article in the collection originally appearing in 
1977 and the latest in 2000. 
A critic will find some of the articles more troubling than others. For 
example, the personal identity paper spends some time addressing the 
relationship between psychological continuity and the identity theory, 
according to which a mental state is identical with a brain state, but has lit-
tle to say about other kinds of materialist theories of the mind and the rela-
tionship of such theories to personal identity. Some will balk as well at van 
Inwagen's mantra of claiming not to understand the views of his oppo-
nents, but the claim is explained often enough that even where it is left 
unexplained, there is no good reason to think it an insubstantial remark. In 
some cases, the argument is not compelling, as in van Inwagen's attack on 
the doctrine of temporal parts. He is successful in clarifying an alternative 
view of the matter, and explaining how this alternative view would find 
the doctrine of temporal parts troubling, but there is little in the argument 
to persuade either holders of the doctrine or neutral observers that there is 
something deeply wrong with the doctrine. One last critical remark: the 
position on creatures of fiction employs a technical use of an ascription 
relation, and in virtue of the technical construal needed, takes the ascrip-
tion relation as primitive as well. Here, I don't understand. I don't see 
how one can use the notion of a property being ascribed to an object, 
observe that the understanding of the notion of ascription is not the ordi-
nary one, and yet take the technical notion to be primitive. I simply do not 
know what relation the use of such a phrase expresses in such a case. 
Beyond these quibbles, however, is a raft of superb philosophical work, 
and one simply cannot read any of these papers carefully and not come 
away more educated. Moreover, there are many classic papers here, in the 
sense that no one competently working on the topic can fail to take them 
into account. I think here especially of the papers on substitutional quan-
tification, four-dimensionalism, material constitution, and perhaps a bit 
surprising, the paper on modal epistemology. 
In sum, the collection is simply superb, and even though there are get-
ting to be a few too many collections of previous work in circulation, this 
one is fully appropriate on any reasonable standard of who's work should 
be published in this way. There are very few philosophers of whom one 
can legitimately give the following advice, without hyperbole: everything 
he writes is worth reading. Van Inwagen is one of them. 
